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In this paper, we reassess the notion and current state of ludo-
hermeneutics in game studies, and propose a more solid foundation
for how to conduct hermeneutic game analysis. We argue that
there can be no ludo-hermeneutics as such, and that every game
interpretation rests in a particular game ontology, whether implicit
or explicit. The quality of this ontology, then, determines a vital
aspect of the quality of the analysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
What is game hermeneutics and why would we need it? What does
it mean to say that we understand a game? Is it enough to say
that we understand a game when we can play it well? What does
it mean to interpret games? And what about the other players?
In a game of poker, the players are interpreting each other, but
are they thereby interpreting the game? Does poker itself have
meaning? Or is it producing new meaning every time it is played?
Clearly, a distinction should be made between the paradigmatic
structure of poker itself and the syntagmatic structure of the poker
session, whereby one is producing the other (with the help of the
players, or poker-robots). But is this the case for all games? Take,
on the one hand, Dragon’s Lair [25] the classic laser-disc action-
adventure. Dragon’s Lair contains a finite number of scenes, but the
order of scenes varies between sessions. In this game, the number of
variations is quite limited; given a little time and a few play-sessions
all possible permutations can be produced very easily, and the game
has given up all its secrets. Here, a textual hermeneutics can be
applied unproblematically, and a game-specific hermeneutic seems
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superfluous - or trivially similar to textual hermeneutics. On the
other hand, in any truly massive multiplayer game like EVE Online
[23] a particular observer cannot come near exhausting even a tiny
fraction of all the possible trajectories; they are infinite, like space
itself. Faced with ludic infinity, game studies need a hermeneutic
theory that can account for both the philological incompleteness
of the ludic object and the in-medias-res of the playing subject.
However, as the two examples show, the notion of games or
even computer games is far too wide to comfortably fit into a single
hermeneutic mold, whether textual or ludic. A highly likely reason
for the lack of successful game hermeneutic theories at this point,
just as the similar lack of narrative game theories until recently
[7], is the lack of an ontological basis on which to build the ludo-
hermeneutic theory. The hermeneutics of film (until the advent of
CGI), literature and visual art all have stable ontological foundations.
In those fields, it has not been necessary or even welcome to discuss
the material, informational, formal and mental preconditions – they
are given and therefore taken for granted. With the indefinable and
problematic category of games, however [9], there exists no stable
ontology (although sub-ontologies are possible, say, for mancala
games, or card games), and therefore no viable ludo-hermeneutic
theory has hitherto been created.
When we approach a game for the first time, we typically already
have a preconceived, ontological notion of what kind of game it is.
This does not imply that the player already has perfect knowledge
of the identity of the object in question. This preconceived notion
will guide or misguide the interpretation and may change in the
gameplay experience which may affect and even change the on-
tology itself. For instance, when people start playing Journey [52]
they are very likely to approach it as a singleplayer game. However,
when encountering certain figures players may suddenly realize
that they are actually playing a multiplayer game, and these figures
are controlled by other human players. In this case, the first ontol-
ogy is replaced by a second one which forces the player to reassess
the game’s identity and the basis for interpretation.
In this paper, we will first review previous attempts to formu-
late a hermeneutic game theory, and then we will present our
arguments for why any such theory needs to be grounded in an
ontological model as well as a general hermeneutics. Finally, we
will discuss what a hermeneutic theory of games is and does, with
a brief example of what a hermeneutically self-aware method of
game interpretation might look like.
Corrected Version of Record v.1.1. Published November 3, 2020
FDG ’20, September 15–18, 2020, Bugibba, Malta Espen Aarseth and Sebastian Möring
2 PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF GAME
HERMENEUTICS
The question of the interpretability of computer games unfolded
early on in game studies. In her pioneering dissertation, Buckles
[19] notes that “the process of reading interactive fiction” implies a
form of self-interpretation [19, p. 4]. This is reminiscent of reading
conventional literature such as the classical Bildungsroman, which
itself serves as a form of self-interpretation for mainly adolescent
audiences. On the other hand – presciently describing the phe-
nomenon that was much later labeled ‘theorycrafting’ – Buckles
frames this self-interpretation as practicing “philosophy of science,”
which involves the interpretation of game events and “distancing
oneself from one’s own preconceptions, [while] testing whether
one’s interpretation of the event is actually correct, and forming a
new interpretation if it is not” [19, pp. 4-5]. Hence, Buckles seems
to distinguish between the interpretation of interactive fiction as
text interpretation as well as an interpretation of this interactive
fiction as a nonlinear dynamic object.
In 1994 one of us [1] suggested two points which should be
considered when formulating a game hermeneutics. The first point
regards the primacy of the praxis of gameplay as an interpretive
process. The second one regards the mechanical game object of the
computer gamewhich forms the basis of such interpretive processes.
Aarseth proposed that a hermeneutics of nonlinear texts requires “a
concept that implies both more and less than reading and redefines
literary satisfaction as well as hermeneutic behavior” [1, p. 67]
which later has been reframed as “real-time hermeneutics” [3, p. 5];
a concept which can be misunderstood as referring to so-called real-
time games only. In his methodology of game analysis, Aarseth [3]
offers a systematic meta-method of game analysis as a self-reflective
hermeneutic practice which takes play and non-play activities into
account; a distinction which Calleja later calls micro-involvement
and macro-involvement in gameplay [22]. Aarseth puts a strong
emphasis on the praxis of gameplay as a form of analysis and
hermeneutic when he says “to show that we understand a game, all
we have to do is to play it well” [3, p. 5]. This mode of interpretation
is primary to narrative or text interpretations since computer games
are the “hermeneutic Other of narratives; the alternative mode of
discourse, bottom up [sic] and emergent where stories are top-down
and preplanned. In simulations [computer games], knowledge and
experience is [sic] created by the player’s actions and strategies,
rather than recreated by a writer or moviemaker” [4]. Therefore, the
postulated hermeneutics of computer games can also be understood
as a hermeneutics of the interplay betweenmechanics and semiotics
(see also [2]; [3]; [26]; [6]).
While Aarseth focuses on the interpretation of the gameplay
process, Murray seems to focus on computer game interpretations
as text interpretations. Her prominent suggestion is that “games
can also be read as texts” [43, p. 143] one page before she offers
her often discussed (cf. [27], [18]; [49]; [14]; [41]) interpretation of
Tetris as “... the perfect enactment of the overtasked lives of Ameri-
cans in the 1990s...” [43, p. 144]. Given that Murray uses the notion
of “reading” in the sense of “interpreting,” this suggests that she
also assumes that a mode of game interpretation is a form of text
interpretation or text hermeneutics. This underlying assumption
sparked some controversy in that Eskelinen dismisses Murray’s
interpretation as a projection of some content onto the game with-
out making sense of the game itself. Specifically, he criticizes that
Murray does not “study [...] the actual game,” and that her interpre-
tation is a projection of her “favorite content” on the game which
however does not teach the reader “anything of the features that
make Tetris a game” [27]. Bogost, on the other hand, argues that
Murray’s “interpretation is certainly a viable one. It suggests the
variety of interpretations available to players of the game” [17, p.
100]. He suggests that Murray’s interpretation lacks a clear refer-
ence to gameplay and the game’s “unit operations” while it takes
into “account a larger system [e.g. modern work conditions] that
the game represents in smaller part” by means of simulation [17,
p. 101]. Apart from a text interpretation of computer games and
interpretations in the process of gameplay, it appears that Bogost
suggests a third relation between interpretations and games. As
simulations of smaller subsets of the world, games interpret the
world in one way or another. Bogost later tries to make this idea
productive with his concepts of “persuasive games” and “procedural
rhetoric” [18].
Distinguishing between how non-ergodic art versus computer
games are interpreted, Eskelinen famously said “in art we might
have to configure in order to be able to interpret whereas in games
we have to interpret in order to be able to configure” [27]. Eskelinen
hereby distinguishes between two kinds of interpretation for two
different kinds of artworks. The interpretation of non-ergodic art
(e.g. paintings or operas) requires the interpreter to configure her
pre-understanding with the work itself until it begins to make
sense in light of the pre-understanding – a process which describes
successful interpretation. Ergodic art such as computer games, on
the other hand, first requires the user to do something with the
artwork, i.e. configure it in order to see how the game reacts to a
specific input. The relation between user input and game output can
then be interpreted as useful, successful, failure etc. which might
or might not lead to further player input and start a hermeneutic
gameplay circle anew.
Arsenault and Perron construct a general model of the gameplay
process which they wittily call the magic cycle. The model is a
response to the lacking “distinction between the process of playing
a game and the game system itself” [12, p. 109]. At the core, the
model consists of two heuristic spirals (gameplay and narrative)
and one hermeneutic spiral (interpretation of hidden meanings, see
also Murray [43]) which are all interconnected in the gameplay
process.
It is problematically conspicuous that Arsenault and Perron con-
sider only the third spiral as hermeneutic whereas the other two
spirals are labeled heuristic. They do not explain why they chose
the latter concept, nor what it denotes. The notion heuristic is of
Greek origin and means to find or to discover by chance, and in
scientific research commonly refers to an unstructured process of
investigation (often trial-and-error) with little guarantee for use-
ful results. It is also used to metaphorically frame an everyday
problem-solving task (cf. [32, pp. 381-382]; [41]). The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy places heuristics mostly in the corner of
computer science being a method for reducing the complexity of
computational problems and the resources needed to solve it [13].
Hence, Arsenault and Perron seem to think of hermeneutics
merely in terms of textual interpretation, and use heuristics for
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solving practical problems and tasks like understanding how a
game works. Thus, their model has two concrete problems. First,
their notion of hermeneutics is much too narrow compared to its
contemporary denotations, which cover all sorts of practical under-
standings of the world in addition to text hermeneutics. Second, it
favors a concept (heuristic) that is prominent in scientific investi-
gation and computational problem solving over a concept which
also accounts for the human capacity of understanding how to deal
with most everyday situations. Computer gameplay normally does
not consist of solving scientific problems, instead it consists of the
practical challenge of playing. And typically, this challenge hardly
exists as a problem to be solved since most game players are already
familiar with their computer games of choice. In puzzles of course
players have to solve puzzle problems (and not scientific problems)
but also in the case of puzzles players usually have previous knowl-
edge of how to puzzle, so they are never facedwith a completely new
problem. Even when faced with a new game, players typically have
at least some knowledge of the gameplay from previous encounters
with similar games. In other words, the concept of hermeneutics
is capable of covering all three of Arsenault and Perron’s spirals.
As we will point out, hermeneutics ranges from an interpretation
involved when practically doing something (like playing a game)
to interpretation in the sense of deriving theoretical meaning from
some object or text (interpreting a text, or interpreting a game’s
textual meaning). The former form of interpretation is involved
in Heidegger’s notion of dealing with something or the world in
a ready-to-hand manner and the latter form of interpretation is
involved in Heidegger’s notion of dealing with something which is
present-at-hand [32, pp. 102-107].
Contrary to Arsenault and Perron, Arjoranta [11] and Karhulahti
[35] consider the act of gameplay as hermeneutic. Arjoranta [11] is
the first to point out explicitly the need for a gameplay hermeneutics
which does not only account for the reading of textual and visual
signs but which accounts for the characteristics of computer games
like their interactivity and temporality. He approaches Aarseth’s
[3] notion of real-time hermeneutics from the angle of time “in
order to understand how temporality affects the understanding
of games” [11]. Arjoranta criticizes Aarseth’s notion of “real-time”
in order to account for the immediate feedback of the computer
game with which a user engages, and posits that real-time can
be experienced in different ways; it is not necessarily immediate.
Following Gadamer, interpretations of non-ergodic artworks can
be enriched by “temporal distance” between the interpretation and
the first occurrence of an interpreted object [11]. He assumes that
the meaning of such a work can be enriched by all other previous
cultural interpretations. Yet, he contends, the idea of real-time game
hermeneutics does not allow for this temporal distance. Arjoranta
seems to imply a twofold hermeneutics consisting of player inter-
pretations during gameplay and after-the-fact (distant) interpreta-
tions involving cultural discourse. Arjoranta appears to distinguish
between micro-involvement and macro-involvement in computer
gameplay, too, although he initially appears to favor after-the-fact
interpretations situated in a cultural discourse; why else would he
find the notion of real-time hermeneutic problematic? However, in
his conclusion, Arjoranta partly dismisses his own approach and
poses two new questions relevant to the present approach: “First,
what is the meaning of the game itself as an object of understand-
ing? And second, what interpretations does the player make during
the game?” [11].
Karhulahti suggests a “double hermeneutic” [35] for the inter-
pretation of computer games and specifically adventure games
which resembles, but does not address, Arsenault and Perron’s dis-
tinction between the heuristic gameplay spiral and the heuristic
narrative spiral. He proposes that playing computer games involves
two hermeneutic circles. The ludic hermeneutic circle refers to
the player’s ludic understanding of the game at play. This implies
that the player configures the game and thereby affects the cur-
rent game state (e.g. opening up new game spaces, new rooms or
changing strategic situations). Karhulahti refers to this as “induc-
ing interpretation that aims at generating ludic understanding of
game elements” [35]. On the other hand, there is what Karhulahti
calls the poetic/aesthetic hermeneutic circle that is concerned with
“acquiring and interpreting narrative or other aesthetic literary in-
formation” [35]. Since the interpreter does not change the narrative
(as in rewriting) but just chooses from given options, Karhulahti
calls this interpretation non-inducing. Adventure games lend them-
selves to the poetic/aesthetic hermeneutic circle: “A comprehensive
understanding of the adventure game object does not therefore
reflect solely on its ludic call to overcome challenges and on its
narrative appeal to restore behavior but also on its facet of poetic
reading” [35].
According to Karhulahti [35], in kinesthetic games (also called
time-critical action games by Pias [48], or “haste”-based by Elver-
dam & Aarseth [26]), the ludic hermeneutic circle will be in the fore-
ground. Thus, Karhulahti suggests a distinction between games that
favor a textual hermeneutic and games that favor a ludic hermeneu-
tic. To Karhulahti, the ludic understanding of a game is a doubly-
interpretational process which he sees as consisting of the fact that
the interpreter influences the interpreted while interpreting:
“The ‘double hermeneutic’ label [...] does not [...] derive solely
from its dual modality [ludic and aesthetic interpretation] but also
from the particular two-way affectivity of ludic interpretation. A
ludic interpretation is not only an object-oriented mental configu-
ration but also a potential object-altering material configuration”
[36].
However, this is not a doubly interpretational process. Influenc-
ing the interpreted while interpreting only means that an inter-
preter interprets a process (which she is part of) rather than an
object. In addition, Karhulahti seems not to account for the fact
that the interpreter herself is part of the interpreted and mistakes
this for a double hermeneutic which can easily be misunderstood.
If there is any doubly-interpretational process going on, then it is
the simultaneous self-interpretation of the player and the player’s
interpretation of the game process which mutually influence each
other. The problem with this double-hermeneutics is furthermore
that it allows to understand driving a car as a double-hermeneutics,
too, and thus, in the long run, turns hermeneutics as such into
a double-hermeneutic process. A viable criticism of Karhulahti’s
double-hermeneutics is that it is not game-specific. Consequently,
the only double-hermeneutics that Karhulahti is suggesting is the
distinction between a practical hermeneutics of gameplay and a
text (or aesthetic/poetic) hermeneutics. We will later see that the
problem Karhulahti is actually dealing with is that between the
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interpretation of a praxis (or a process) as something which is expe-
rienced from a first-person perspective versus the interpretation of
an object which is present-at-hand as something which is looked
at from a third-person perspective (cf. [41]).
3 GENERAL HERMENEUTICS
One of the central problems of previous discussions of game
hermeneutics is that most approaches are not properly grounded
in existing hermeneutic theories such as those by Heidegger and
Gadamer. We therefore want to revisit some central ideas from
hermeneutic theory because it offers useful distinctions on the way
to a game hermeneutics.
Until today hermeneutics is commonly regarded as a practice of
text interpretation. From this perspective, hermeneutics is rooted
in the exegesis of biblical texts in order to analyze the word of God,
and to apply it as a guideline for a life well-lived. Contemporary
hermeneutics scholarship agrees that early roots of hermeneutics
go even back to Greek antiquity where the epics by Homer were
systematically analyzed with “a method of nonliteral interpretation
of the authoritative texts [...] aiming at a deeper sense, hidden under
the surface – hypónoia, i.e., underlying meaning.” This method has
become known as allegoresis [39]. If Arsenault and Perron [12]
refer to game hermeneutics as finding a hidden meaning it seems
they refer to this notion of hermeneutics.
Among the most influential theorists of modern hermeneutics
are Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heideg-
ger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. While critics mention “a general
hermeneutics had existed at least two centuries before Schleierma-
cher” [39]. Schleiermacher is accepted as the first to distinguish
between hermeneutics as a “methodology of text processing and the
theory of human understanding as such” [10]. In doing so Schleier-
macher distinguishes between a narrow idea of hermeneutics as lit-
erary or text interpretation and a broad idea of hermeneutics which
designates human understanding in general. Dilthey, a follower
of Schleiermacher, set out to characterize the German Geisteswis-
senschaften (humanities) and raises hermeneutics to the rank of
its central method. While the primary epistemological mode of the
natural sciences is to explain (erklären), the humanities’ mode is
understanding (verstehen) (cf. [10] and [39]).
With Heidegger’s Being and Time [32] hermeneutics takes a
new turn, and is no longer merely considered the epistemologi-
cal method of the humanities or a method of text interpretation.
Hermeneutics is now considered the central way of how humans
exist in the world [20]. For Heidegger, a human being is always al-
ready understandingly-in-the-world in that humans always already
tacitly understand their world, its specific affordances, limitations,
and conditions by just dealing with it in their everyday lives. Hei-
degger expert, Dreyfus, explains this as follows: “To understand a
hammer [...] does not mean to know that hammers have such and
such properties [...] understanding a hammer at its most primor-
dial sense means knowing how to hammer” [24, p. 184, italics in
original].
Hence, understanding how to hammer neither implies one’s ca-
pacity to understand the cultural meaning of a hammer in a given
discourse, nor the capacity to name its scientific characteristics.
In Heidegger’s hermeneutics understanding is first of all practical
and it is the prerequisite of all theoretical understanding – since
humans first and foremost exist in their everyday copings with
the world and not in a mode of scientific interpretation of their
world. Interpreting Heidegger, Dreyfus writes “understanding re-
veals some actions as doable, as making sense, and others as not”
[24, p. 185]. This primordial practical understanding of the world,
then, is the condition of possibility of text interpretation (e.g. in
terms of an allegoresis), or a scientific interpretation of the world.
Heidegger’s hermeneutics consists of a complex structure of which
we will only refer to those elements which relate directly to our
argument. Depending on the translation Heidegger mentions ei-
ther “leeway” [32, p. 185] or “room for maneuver” [24, p. 186] as
an essential element of understanding since every human being
understands tacitly or cognitively its possibilities to be. If there is
more than one option to choose from then we can speak of a room
for maneuver. The German translation interestingly is Spielraum
(literally “space of play”). It is Gadamer who makes this play ele-
ment in hermeneutics productive as we will show in a bit. With
Heidegger, we can furthermore distinguish between an authentic
and inauthentic understanding. A human being understands how
to exist inauthentically when only realizing those options which
are pre-interpreted as the most common way to exist [38]. On the
other hand, a human being understands how to be authentically
when it manages to realize its very own possibilities to be.
Eventually, Heidegger distinguishes between three types of under-
standing: Coping, interpreting, and asserting [24].
• Understanding as coping describes the “unreflective, every-
day, projective activity such as hammering” and it “becomes
explicit in the practical deliberation necessitated when a skill
failed to suffice, and what has thus become thematic” [24, p.
195]. To give an example from computer gameplay: We are
able to play Super MarioWorld [44] without needing to cogni-
tively reflect on what we are doing. But this would not work
with Kaizo Mario World [51], the famous and overly difficult
modification of Super Mario World. Clearly, coping, when
successful, is different from a heuristic in that it proceeds in
an unreflected way.
• Understanding as interpreting, then, means to make sense
of that which cannot be coped with on the first level of
understanding [24]. This happens when we realize that we
cannot play Kaizo Mario in the self-presumed way in which
we play Super Mario World.
• Understanding as asserting, then, means to thematize that
which cannot be coped with and to find e.g. reasons for this
– such as the game is too difficult, the player is not skilled
enough, or the simulated platforms are too far apart in order
to make Mario jump from one to the other, etc.
In effect, these three stages of understanding describe the process of
how something which is first experienced as ready-to-hand changes
its mode into being experienced as present-at-hand; i.e. it changes
from being experienced in use (first-order experience or first-person
experience) to being experienced while being looked at (second-
order experience or third-person experience). From this brief review
of Heidegger, we see that his hermeneutics works well to describe
the processes of understanding, interpreting and asserting in com-
puter gameplay, and also that Heideggerian hermeneutics applies
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the notion of Spielraum (leeway or room to move) to explain how
understanding works.
Following this, Gadamer makes the concept of play central and
productive in his hermeneutics. For Gadamer, the artwork only
comes into existence when it is appreciated or interpreted by an
observer; i.e. when it is part of a hermeneutic process. No matter if
the artwork itself is an object (e.g. a painting) or a process (e.g. a
theater play or interactive art), the interpreter engageswith it from a
third-person perspective and engages with it in a hermeneutic circle
that has the form of the to-and-fro movement of a game at play [30].
For Gadamer, the subject of a game is not merely the human player
but the game itself [30]. As a matter of fact, a game for Gadamer
is first and foremost a form that needs a medium to perform its
characteristic movement [30]. This medium can be playing humans
or animals, but also natural phenomena such as waves or light,
or even the process of interpretation in a hermeneutic circle [30].
Consequently, for a game to come to itself it is necessary that its
players understand how to keep a game at play, and therefore games
have the existential requirement that their players keep it at play by
interpreting the tasks provided by the game in a way that maintains
the game. A different way to keep a game at play than preventing it
from a premature game-over is to keep exploring for its possibilities
to unfold. The same goes for all other artworks: If they fail to keep
their audience engaged in a process of ongoing interpretation they
cease to be artworks. With this in mind, it appears that Heidegger’s
hermeneutics is focusing on the point of view of an interpreting
human subject whereas in Gadamer’s hermeneutics the subject of
interpretation is the game or the game of interpretation itself.
While interpretation and hermeneutics might have the form of
play, followingHeidegger and especially Gadamer (or even Derrida),
this does not mean that the question of game hermeneutics is solved
here. Computer game-play is often understood as a cybernetic feed-
back loop and the Gadamerian framing of the hermeneutics of
artworks as a hermeneutic circle seems to tie in very well with
cybernetics. However, conceptualizing computer game-play merely
as a feedback loop is not sufficient in order to understand how
the hermeneutic to-and-fro works in the case of specific computer
games. In order to account for the specificity of computer games
as media technologies and as technological practice, we must first
have a proper ontology of computer games. This proposal is dis-
cussed in the following section, after which we will account for the
differences among ludic objects and lay out their consequences for
the possibility of a ludo-hermeneutic theory.
4 PRECONDITIONS FOR A
LUDO-HERMENEUTICS
A hermeneutics of ludic objects and processes, like any other
hermeneutics, presumes an ontological basis as mentioned above.
An ontology is a generalized set of principles based on observations
of an empirical field – in other words, a theory of relevant phe-
nomena and their relations – whereas a hermeneutics is a method
of interpretation directed towards a specific, historically delimited
object or situation. Before the interpretation can take place, the
phenomenon must be identified as belonging to a class or genre for
which the method is appropriate. In other words, first comes the
ontological identification, then the hermeneutics, at least on the
receiving end. An enologist, preparing to blind taste wine, will not
be able to make sense of goat milk or crude oil within their expert
framework. A connoisseur of horror films will similarly be con-
fused by Cabin in the Woods, which appears to be a classical/clichéd
horror movie, but then reveals itself to instead be science fiction in
a brilliant illustration of what Brian McHale [40] refers to as the
ontological dominant of science fiction (and postmodernism).
The fundamental challenge to establishing a ludo-hermeneutics
is that games are not one type of phenomenon. This should warn
us that ludo-hermeneutics, at best, must be a family of hermeneutic
theories or models rather than one. An alternative would be a
hermeneutic theory that is on a high enough level of abstraction
that all kinds of games are covered, but then we also face the risk
that it is a hermeneutics of everything – and therefore of nothing
in particular. A synthesis of these two alternatives is a general,
high-level template, which can be expanded into several targeted
hermeneutic models in each ludic subdomain.
The execution of such a synthesis would be a dynamic hermeneu-
tic method which has a game session and a specific ontological
perspective as input, and completes itself upon playing and under-
standing (or in occasional addition, as a critical assertion).
Just as in literary, cinematic or pictorial analysis, where the
analyst describes important features of the text/image (typically
the plot or tableau) before they evaluate and interpret it, so should
a ludo-analyst describe the ontological makeup of the game before
commencing the critique. However, it is more common to fast-
travel over this by instead throwing down a genre label (e.g. RPG,
FPS) and then a summary of the scenario or of the plot of the
main storyline (if there is one). By glossing over the ontological
specificities, however, the analyst not only demonstrates a lack
of curiosity for the ludic (as opposed to textual) aspects, but also
blinds the analysis from discovering any potentially unique aspects
of that particular ludic object. An analysis that places all weight
on the textual aspects will not be able to address the hermeneutic
dimension of playing, or what it means to be a player of that game.
If by “game” we simply refer to the textual elements of the ludic
object, then this omission would pose no problem, however, we
are then using the word game metonymically, to refer to a part
of what the ludic object is. We are no longer addressing – much
less analyzing – the game of the “game.” Instead, we are addressing
and analyzing the uninformed spectator’s view, the game’s tex-
tual/audiovisual output, and not engaging with the primary locus
of ludic meaning, which is the player’s hermeneutic behavior – the
process of making sense of the game. Games still do produce mean-
ing on that secondary, spectatorial level which should be studied
also, but the two are very different. The first spectator is always
the player herself, but ludo-spectatorship is a broad spectrum or
field of different types and positions of engagement, which should
not be conflated [8].
Just like the academic meme that “everyone has a theoretical
grounding, even if they don’t make it explicit,” every game scholar
has an ontological basis for their analysis, even if they don’t de-
clare it or reflect on it. But unless forced to confront their implicit
ontology, game scholars – given the extremely vague nature of
their objects of study – typically make the fallacies of overreaching
or over-generalizations. A highly useful exercise is to always take
the time to describe the ontological profile of the games we are
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discussing, even and perhaps especially when they are known to
everyone like Tetris or chess. Reminding ourselves what we are
looking at can make us see it anew, and thus as a phenomenon in
its own right and not just as a handy example of what we want to
discuss.
What game ontology should we use? There are already quite
a lot of them (e.g. [54]; [56]; [21]) and while they never seem to
address, much less engage each other, most provide a helpful stage
of reflection, as the first phase of interpretation. For the purposes of
this article, game ontology is an ongoing scientific dialogue that still
has a long way to go, and therefore should not be pinned down at
this moment. As long as a game’s ontology is not taken for granted,
our purpose has been served. The ludontology assumed in this
article is laid out in Calleja & Aarseth [9] and posits a game as
a four-dimensional field composed of mental activity (the player
and her community) a semiotic system (the audio-visual or tactile
communicative aspects), a mechanical system (influencing the game
state) and a materiality (the physical environment in which the
game is embedded, including the players’ bodies).
Is a game different from a text, or are they the same? This ques-
tion presupposes an idea of what a text is. Here we have many alter-
natives: Text could refer to a philological object of ordered (typically
linear) orthographic signifiers, or it could be a post-structuralist
web of meaning, or it could be any semiotic object or corpus as
espoused by studies of art (such as a poster, a film, a sculpture, a city,
or any collage or semiotic assemblage). In this context, it does not
really matter much which one we select so long as we recognize its
implied primacy of a semiotic focus. A game, then – understood as
a mechanical system and not a social process – is not a text. A game
is a type or family of phenomena that may use texts and semiotic
codes for ludic purposes, but in different ways depending on the
game’s ontology. Some games are purely text-based (e.g. riddles,
classic detective or crime mysteries), meaning that they contain
their mechanical structures either implicitly (detective story) or
explicitly (choose your own adventure). Others are predominantly
textual (hyperfiction, Twine games) and others are hybrids that rely
on text and mechanics equally (adventure games). As long as we
can describe the mechanical system independently of the textual
or diegetic elements (e.g., as a system of formal connections), we
can maintain the difference between textual representation and
mechanics, and the functional distinction between text and game is
preserved. In the few cases we cannot do this (detective novels and
verbal role-playing games) then we simply invoke the ontological
category of fiction-based games, or games of mimicry [21].
5 A METHOD OF LUDIC INTERPRETATION
Each game (or, depending on how we delimit games, game genre;
see [31]) comes with its own implied hermeneutics. This hermeneu-
tics is its own circular process or interpretive “feedback loop” [2],
by which we play, learn and grasp. If a game offers more than
one playing process (a set of interrelated mechanics engaged by a
player), is it still only one game? And if two different games have
the same playing process, are they not the same game? Clearly,
there are examples of both alternatives:World of Warcraft [16] of-
fers many different playing processes, from auction-house trade to
battleground competitions. As players can easily devote themselves
to one and not the other, these are, in fact, two different games in the
same ‘game’ or virtual world. On the other hand, in football (soccer,
to Americans), playing as a goalkeeper is a very different playing
process than playing as a striker, but it would be hard to claim
that football is two different games. Perhaps the crucial difference
between these two examples is that in football the players work
together on the same project and in the same process, whereas in
WoW they do not. On an abstract level, we can define ‘playing the
same game’ as ‘engaging the same set of mono-ludic mechanics.’
Also, Counter-Strike [53] is typically seen as one or the same
game, although it makes a lot of difference to the players’ processes
what sort of level or map is being played. Is Counter-Strike on the
Dust 2 map the same game as Counter-Strike on Aztec? In fact,
it is more complicated; some Counter-Strike levels are infinitely
more popular than others, and the most popular levels embody
what Counter-Strike is as a game. As the name suggests, Dust 2
(2001) was not an original Counter-Strike map but became the most
popular map. Through this popularity and from then on, Dust 2
helped define what an ideal Counter-Strike map should be like (see
[34]). Even though Counter-Strike existed as a game before Dust
2 was made, it became more itself as a result of Dust 2. We might
think of such a process as exceptional, but most games are created
gradually, in a creative testing loop (cf. [29]; [46]; [42]) or even
more slowly, over the centuries or millennia, like chess and Snakes
and Ladders. As the game is played, it becomes itself and changes
itself in an endless double hermeneutic feedback loop between
the player and the game; both are played by the other, and both
change – the player more quickly, the game more slowly. The game
itself has, or better, is a hermeneutic method, whereby it becomes
itself via repeated play. Ironically, however, the game encountered
by the player is not the hermeneutic process, but its ontological
result – its here-and-now. The exceptions to this argument would
be game design processes and formation of house-rules etc., but in
computer-mediated play (and unlike, say, board-gameplay), these
formative and transformative practices are precisely exceptions,
and therefore not commonplace play practices [5].
What has been called game hermeneutics (see [11], [36]), is rather
the player’s hermeneutics: the process of becoming-a-player. This
is also the uncovering of the game’s ontology; the realization of
what it takes to be a player of that particular game, and of getting
to know the game’s here-and-now.
Let’s apply this understanding to a simple game analysis example.
Fallout: New Vegas (F:NV, [45]) is one of the most intriguing and rich
ludo-narrative works in recent years. It belongs to the long-running
Fallout series (1997-) and is a zoned, open-world leveling-up game
using the Fallout-series S.P.E.C.I.A.L. avatar-development system.
As a game system, it is virtually the same as Fallout 3 [15], with
minor modifications. As a post-apocalyptic game world set in a
future US southwest desert landscape, however, it is much more de-
tailed and rich than its predecessor, and the various factions, quests
and characters are more complex and many-faceted, depending on
what allegiances and playstyles the player chooses. The player has
the role-position of the Courier, near-fatally shot in the head and
left for dead, with no clear reminiscence of their current mission.
A cornucopia of interesting choices awaits, and it would be close
to impossible to analyze satisfactorily all the possibilities for action
in this article. For a fascinating and contrasting alternative to this
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openness, see Leino’s [37] existential account of being stuck in a
F:NV “death loop.”
Instead of a full analysis, let us look at a particular encounter
with a particular character of the game. Caesar, the leader of Cae-
sar’s Legion, is a brutal tyrant who vies for control of the desert
wasteland against various other powerful clans and alliances. The
Courier may get close to Caesar and become a collaborator, run
quests, and so on, or may decide to fight Caesar and his Legion
instead. Given the Legion’s brutality and horrific treatment of the
other wasteland inhabitants – including the use of crucifixion –
this might be the easiest choice. However, Caesar is a fascinating
character to talk to and explore, and any adverse strategy will not
accommodate this option. But on a more epic scale, one might also
think twice before helping the worst tyrant take over the entire
region. So, what to do? The game is a singleplayer experience that
allows near-unlimited saves, and so one is free to follow more than
one branch of the plotted network. The player could first choose to
go along with Caesar and get the experience of the quest-line until
(perhaps) a sense of ludo-morality brings one to the point of return,
and one recedes to a previous, morally safer save point where the
player proceeds to fight or ignore Caesar instead. Fighting Caesar
will eventually allow the competent player to kill him, thus ridding
the world of a dangerous tyrant. However, for the end-game this
turns out to be not very effectual and instead paradoxical, as Caesar
is succeeded by an even more murderous lieutenant, Legate Lanius
(Lanius is Latin for butcher).
The hermeneutic method we can use for exploring Caesar and
the Caesar’s Legion characters and quests is defined by the game
and the player in communion, and would be very different from,
say, analyzing an MMO game like Elder Scrolls Online [55] or a
linear quest game like Final Fantasy VII [50]. It could on the other
hand be very similar to the same player analyzing Fallout 3 [15].
The method is flexible in terms of the game landscape, but lim-
ited by the player’s genre-based gameplay habits (ludo-habitus),
game-dependent choices of special skills, and the order in which the
quests are pursued. It is also dependent on the game’s interpretive
community, and on what they have made available in resources for
the player, e.g. as online videos, walkthroughs, or general informa-
tion.
For the game scholar or academic game critic, however, this
method is not sufficient. Their assertive goal is to present their com-
munities with a verbal account of their ludo-hermeneutic insights,
not just with the fact that they have attained an understanding of
the game in the shape of a high score or similar. For them, and
unlike, say, a musician interpreting a musical score or an actor
interpreting a role on stage, the process of asserting the results of
the investigation becomes the main effort of the investigation itself.
Thence, interpretation becomes the formulation of that interpreta-
tion, rather than the interpretation itself.
Also, scholars hardly ever interpret just for the sake of interpre-
tation; there is always an ulterior motive, typically in the shape of a
research question. Critics, similarly, are motivated by normativity:
asserting some particular quality in the present work is worth point-
ing out. In both these types of cases, the method will be dictated
by the motive, and will therefore be as idiosyncratic as the motive
itself. Game hermeneutics, then, is the meeting of a particular game
and a particularly motivated player, and, depending on the motive,
will result in a particular, critical enunciation. There can be no
ludo-hermeneutic method as such, only pragmatic methods serving
particular purposes. A catalog of such purposes, however, is beyond
our present scope. The universal method that can be formulated
here is the identification of the game’s ontological nature. This is
the first step of ludo-hermeneutics, and the only step that implic-
itly or explicitly is necessary. The rest depends on game type and
player motivation. Game types form interpretive communities [28]
and interpretive communities motivate players to develop specific
methods of interpretation, assertive or not.
6 CONCLUSION: FIRST COMES THE
ONTOLOGY, THEN THE HERMENEUTICS
The practices of ludo-hermeneutics presume a specific ontological
basis, either explicitly or implicitly. This holds true for players,
critics, and theorists alike. As we saw in the Journey example in the
introduction of this paper, there is of course a to-and-fro movement
between these two aspects, the abstract and the particular, where
playing leads to increased ontological understanding. A particular
process of interpretation cannot take place without an underlying
ontological model, however weak it may be initially. There is no
universal gameplay that pertains to every kind of game, and there
is no hermeneutic method of game analysis as such; only game-
specific or genre-specific depending on how we conceive of the
game/genre (token/type) demarcation.
Consequently, any ludo-hermeneutic theory which contents it-
self by framing all games as a cybernetic or hermeneutic feedback
loop misses the point because such models unintentionally make
all games alike, which they are not. Since approaches to game
hermeneutics are necessarily diverse due to the diversity of com-
puter games, a possible way to learn more about game hermeneu-
tics could be to meta-review a large collection of individual game-
hermeneutic analyses which make their underlying ontology ex-
plicit, and compare and collate those ontologies.
Or, instead of relying on existing ontologies, we could make a
new and better (meta-) ontology, whereby ontological descriptions
for particular games and game genres could be minted in a more
systematic and less blurry way than what we have seen so far. With
such a tool, the formal, structural and syntactic differences between
different games could be swiftly identified and set aside, leaving
the scholar or critic to get on with the perhaps more interesting
questions of ludic meaning and interpretation.
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